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COUNSEL IN PAROLE HEARINGS
FRANK L. CALDWELL*
Imprisonment may follow a legal trial. Imprisonment may follow an
administrative hearing. If the former, there will have been forceful asser-
tions by legally trained counsellors professionally committed to prevail
by argument over opposition. Ideally, the counsellors will have been of
comparable capabilities, ethical and adequately enabled by resources. This
adversary system of determining guilt or innocence has earned a long
.standing reputation of considerable reliability. Administrative agencies
while firmly established are not traditional and their procedures are not
yet absolute. Accountants, psychiatrists and others sometimes act as
counsel in administrative proceedings. Legal counsel may or may not be
present and may appear in a more or less restricted capacity depending
upon function of the agency and the nature of the inquiry.
Contemplations of a parole board, an administrative agency, leave
some observers intolerant of the absence of counsel from its administrative
hearings. Those so persuaded contend for legalistic parole procedures
with hearings at the site of violations, legal counsel, notice, pleadings,
subpoena power, confrontation, cross-examination, judicial review of
each of the foregoing and all the other adjective legal protections of liberty.
They have concluded that such is preferable to finality of fair decisions by
an administrative parole board which probably includes lawyers along
with other impartial, able and experienced people from other disciplines.
In New York State on an average of the years between 1959 and 1970,
such a board annually released to parole supervision 63.3% of those
eligible and on an annual average returned as violators 12.8% of those
under active supervision during all or part of a calendar year, while an
annual average of 1.5% were returned by courts with new sentences.
Reference may be made to the statistical table which follows.
Parolees are a minority group. Their backgrounds are often dis-
advantaged and they are generally of limited resources. Parolees comprise
other minority groups. They are people in need. They are vulnerable to
discriminatory acts and attitudes. General good will be promoted by
supplying them every reasonable protection. However, identification of
* Member of New York State Board of Parole.
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the exact protection that will flow from legal counsel at parole hearings
to parolees and to society seems less than crystal clear.
Counsel, whether legally trained or otherwise possessed of sufficient
legal know-how renders various services relative to parole hearings.
Counselling by various disciplines has always been the keystone of parole
services. Counsellors influence human behavior and help other people
live acceptably and productively. Counsel enlightens parolees and prevents
them from misunderstanding and misinterpreting. Many parolees have
language difficulties. Legal counsel might explain parolees' actions, con-
ditions, positions or attitudes in a manner never heretofore done. Legal
counsel could define legal implications and explain legal responsibilities
to parolees. Such counsel's abilities, in organizing and implementing
parolees' evidence, would be of value. Cultural gaps might be discovered
by counsel. Counsel's persuasiveness could operate. Those who contend
for more legalistic parole hearings say that attributes such as the fore-
going are valuable to parolees and to society. They seem to say these
betterments will flow from legal counsel's presence. They seem to assert
that enhancements by legal counsel will be proportionate to their costs
measured timewise, moneywise and otherwise.
One wonders! Do legally trained counsel have special resources en-
abling effective performance of these and other similar services? Is such
capacity an inherency of legal training? Can lawyers normally be expected
to perform these and other services valuable to parole truth searches better
than persons of other disciplines? Must those performing these services
function in parole hearings? Is it likely that private counsel, on a case-by-
case basis, will perform these services better than they are now being
rendered in parole processes? Is the public likely to be better protected
by another trial-type hearing than by the more informal, more personal
inquiry into a person's feelings and attitudes in a setting where his sensi-
tivities are not insulated by counsel? If public funds are not available to
provide counsel for all parolees, will society be bettered by allowing counsel
for some? Will trial-type restraints produce better parole decisions; or put
another way, is it more productive of truth to disregard the statement of
an apparently loving mother to a parole officer: "I've never seen real proof
of this, but I know my son is using heroin"; or put still another way, shall
we submit mom and the parole officer to cross-examination; or from an-
other frame of reference, must we say: "Inspector, since your information
is from an informant you won't identify, we won't confine the parolee
while we verify his conduct even though he said he'd commit the robbery
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol3/iss1/3
COUNSEL IN PAROLE HEARINGS 3
tonight"; or, finally, is it likely the inspector will supply such information
if he and his informant are subject to cross-examination? Is it best to
limit the flexibility and dispatch that permit development and further
evaluation of the doctrine that correctional programs are most prom-
isingly viewed as "levels of custody ?" Is it community protection to assure
parolees that they cannot be returned to prison quickly? Is it improvement
to postpone finality of fair decisions by judicial review? Is an adversary
proceeding likely to improve above quoted New York percentages? Is it
not difficult to answer questions in this paragraph: "Yes ?"
Will lawyers be as subject as others are subject to becoming possessed
of ingrained and insensitive attitudes; or rephrased, do lawyers develop
fixated attitudes like other people? Is one indispensable essential of ad-
versary truth finding, freedom of counsel to refuse to represent a client
in whose cause he does not believe? Do the next two considerations
mitigate against regular legal representation of parolees by a staff attorney
or by groups of lawyers like Legal Aid? Are others not only as able
to draw logical conclusions, but like medics, able also to draw professional
conclusions from the same facts? If we want better decisions, would it be
better to introduce into parole proceedings psychologists, psychiatrists,
anthropologists or sociologists instead of lawyers? Do man's feelings
direct his actions? Are one's feelings likely to be more exposed and
measurable without counsel at a parole hearing? Parole is embryonic when
compared to courts: parole decisions relate to predictive risks: does not a
dose of counsel further inhibit parole's maturation as a publicly acceptable
imperfect predictor? Has parole's performance been sufficiently reliable
when compared with courts to merit avoidance of this inhibition? Is
there likelihood that if counsel enters parole hearings, that parole releases
must, in reason, be reduced in number because there will be a doubt
whether a parolee, who becomes recognizable as a potential violator, can
be returned in time to prevent more injurious behavior? Will only a few
parolees benefit from counsel at parole hearings? Will this further dis-
advantage the bulk of parolees? Do organized criminals probably want
lawyers in parole proceedings? Is it not difficult to convince yourself the
answer to the questions in this paragraph is: "No"?
In a 4-3 decision, the New York State Court of Appeals decided in
1971, that procedural due process under both the United States Con-
stitution and the New York Constitution requires that parolees have
entitlement to the assistance of legal counsel in parole revocation hearings.
This decision is entitled the People ex rel. Joseph Menechino, Appellant,
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v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, Respondent. It is recorded 27
NY 2nd 376, and will be hereinafter referred to as Menechino.
This decision says: ". . . the right to the assistance of an attorney at
the hearing is constitutionally mandated . . ." A revocation hearing is
".... an accusatory proceeding ... The outcome is dependent upon the
board's factual determination as to the truth of specific allegations . . ."
Counsel is valuable ". . . in developing and probing factual and legal
situations which may determine . . ." imprisonment. Counsel may
"... analyze and question the accuracy of the parole supervisor's re-
port . . . " and ". . educe and marshall the positive facts necessary to
refute the technical and rather ambiguous charge. . ." He may introduce
"... evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aid and assist
defendant to present his case ..."
Participation by counsel need be no greater than is required to assure,
to the board as well as to the parolee, that the board is, insofar as
the parolee is concerned, accurately informed of the facts before it acts,
and the permitted presentation of testimony by the parolee need be no
greater than is necessary for that same purpose. Meeting these require-
ments will not ... occasion the slightest relaxation of supervisory con-
trol over parolees. It is the board alone which is to ascertain the facts
and decide their ultimate importance . . .
The decision speaks against undue delay. It directs the Board of Parole
to conduct a hearing at which the alleged violator shall be entitled to the
assistance of counsel and permitted to call witnesses.
This decision may be the precursor of a series of decisions holding
that procedural due process requires all the elements of the legalistic ad-
versary truth search. The decision makes this reference to language in a
related case ". . . had parole revocation been at issue rather than parole
release, fundamental fairness might dictate that the prisoner be accorded
constitutional due process at a trial-type hearing including the right
to legal counsel . . ." The Court indicates that the search for truth
"... is not to be sacrificed to administrative speed and convenience . . .
the presence of counsel . . . constitutes the bedrock characteristic of our
system of administrative justice . . ." Maybe bail, confrontation, cross-
examination and the rest will all be required in future. Such was not
required by the court in this pronouncement. This decision may be within
the trend of judicial decisions toward greater review of administrative
justice. This decision is innovative. It may be an opening wedge into
parole; or, it may be a total intendment.
4
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Language in Menechino is absolutely clear in restricting its rule to
parole revocation hearings. Counsel's allowance into revocation hearings
seems a clear probability of counsel's entry into release hearings. If
counsel's protections are needed by parolees at all, there is greater need to
insure fairness to an individual in releases than there is to insure fair
returns by an agency already having demonstrated enough confidence in an
individual to -have freed him from prison. On this basis, much which
follows refers to implication of the Menechino rule upon parole board
decisions generally, releases as well as revocations.
Parole is in a transitional stage. In New York, it has been affected
by mandatory and conditional releases as well as by a major governmental
reorganization. It presently seems that the primary responsibilities of the
New York State Parole Board are to fairly control the passage of trans-
gressors between facilities and communities; restoration of rights and
privileges and rendition of advisory services. Its sphere of influence and
responsibility has been substantially reduced. Yet, there still remains its
critical power over freedom which always has been its essence and basic
responsibility.
This power to imprison is awesome. But, more definitive in terms
of interpreting this decision and more productive in terms of performance
of all parole duties is the advisability that all parole authorities assume
attitudes and postures consistent with duties and responsibilities. Theirs
should not be a power orientation. They should be most attentive to their
duties to fairly protect communities from undue risk at the same time they
perform their duty of fairly protecting individual liberties. All parole
power revolves around this duality of fairness in performing duties. Such
is the inherent nature and purpose of all parole procedures, hearings and
decisions. The broad duties to promote community security and to enable
further generation of individual development by opening the door for people
to benefit from community-based social casework techniques which may
include bodily restraint seem most significant in meaningfully applying
this decision.
The parole function is so sensitive as to demand examination of
prospective parolees by board members beyond the form orientation of
usual adversary proceedings. Parole includes a duty to prevent anticipated
difficulties as well as a duty to treat proven transgressions. In performing
their part of these duties, parole board members, at parole hearings, seek
factual truth. Throughout parole's history, true descriptions of past
occurrences have been provided reliably by a professional parole staff.
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On facts so described, 69.2% of those eligible for parole were released
in 1970 in New York State, and of those under active supervision during
all or part of 1970 only 16.3% were returned as violators by the Parole
Board and 1.8% were returned by the courts as new commitments.
Liberty has turned and does partly turn on factual determinations. Parole
decisions are partly decisions of fact. Insofar as disputed factual situations
are involved, a trial-type hearing is not inappropriate. But one can hardly
argue that a parole board performs its entire duty in decision making if
it acts solely as a jury acts. It is, by the statute of which it is a creature,
required to do much more.
Before reaching New York's Parole Board for final determination, a
factual decision has been acted upon by the parole officer who supervised
the parolee, by the senior parole officer who participated in such super-
vision in an advisory capacity, and most often by a supervising parole
officer, a higher functionary in the administrative chain. The critical duty
of parole boards is to predict behavior. Trial-type procedures tend
to inhibit exposure of indicators such as feelings, attitudes and sensitivities
of prospective parolees. During parole board hearings, board members
look not only for factual truth but they want and try to look at and evaluate
true and real reactions of prospective parolees who often are experienced,
hardened people. Often these reactions can best be produced by questions
which are in law called, and appreciated by parole boards as, indefinite,
general, suggestive, complex, or even argumentative. Boards may use
hearsay to create a genuine reaction. Reactions to the high stress level
in parole hearings is an indicator of what reaction to societal stress may be
if the prospective parolee is paroled. Responses are predictive tools. They
may show the existence of strength indicated by a case history to be needed
for successful adjustment. A show of genuine anger in response to im-
position may be just what a parole board wants to see in a previously sub-
missive, easily led person. Observation of the anger will be more predictive
than a lukewarm, low key presentation under counsel's tutelage. If the
board creates the impetus for the anger, there is little room for suspicion
that is, a staged, "phony" or theatrical reaction.
The question which would be legally objectionable in a trial need not
seek an answer of probative value to be the only effective kind of probe in
existence to induce a measurable reaction. A surgeon need not be truthful
with a patient to render an accurate diagnosis. The patient had better be
truthful with his surgeon for a successful operation to be probable. Some-
times it is best for patients that surgeons not disclose facts. Parole boards
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are greatly enabled to accurately predict by evaluation of true expressions
of parole applicant's attitudes. The expression may be antisocial, hostile or
otherwise offensive. But true manifestations of applicant's feelings are of
greater predictive value than all that legal formulary can reasonably be
expected to produce. Of greatest value are true expressions of the parolee's
opinion and his conception of truth. Such may be inaccurate, even un-
sound, but if they are true, they are of great value. An experienced parole
board member is likely to be better able to discover and interpret true
offerings of today's offender than are lawyers. Lawyers are oriented by
training and experience to advocate, to be committed to the single view
of the advocacy, to argue and to sell: yes, even to camouflage. Truth is
distilled at a trial from the adversity of competing conceptions of truth.
Neither parole boards nor parole staffs are against parolees. All parolees
at revocation hearings have enjoyed the undeniable confidence and sup-
port of parole staff and parole boards. Such staff reports enabled boards
to set them free.
It is meaningful in respect to whether homicide, assault, theft and/or
rape may be anticipated to be committed in futuro that parole boards
accurately measure in terms of the challenges of today the reactive strengths
and weaknesses of prospective parolees. The parole hearing is the fulcrum
of parole board measurement of these risks. It is of minimal meaningful-
ness in respect to whether crime may be anticipated to conform permitted
expressions of prospective parolees to the parole board at parole hearings
to the precedent legal forms originating in antiquity. For such conforma-
tion to be newly required is creative of risk. Let us be certain, absolutely
so, that the anticipated betterment merits the risk. Might we not again,
now, refer to the foregoing percentages? Are judicial performances com-
parable? Will betterment accompany counsel into parole hearings?
Intervention between parole board members and prospective parolees
which insulates one from the other parole hearings by allegiances, de-
pendencies or otherwise is defeative of performance of the duty of boards
to decide. Attorneys insulate in trials. Defendant's right to stand mute is
absolute. How now, with counsel in parole hearings, may counsel speak
absolutely for prospective parolees? What otherwise is counsel to be
there for, if not to direct presentation? Must parole boards predict parolee
behavior only from what counsel chooses to offer?
Lawyers' influence on parolees will be transitory. Lawyers restrict legal
imposition to incidents of proven misconduct in isolated form. They are
rarely responsible for future conduct of clients. Parole boards are.
7
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Objectivity of systems results from fixed standards. Behavior pre-
diction seems not yet sufficiently standardized as to accommodate legalistic
proceedings. This is not to say all parole releases are entirely sub-
jective. Releases are according to law to follow formation of the opinion
that parolees ". . . will live and remain at liberty without violating
the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of so-
ciety . . . ." New York Correction Law, section 213. To the extent that
this and similar statutory standards require subjectivity, there must be
such in the exercise of parole decision making.
Maybe there will be developed by man standards by which to define
accurately behavioral predictors. We may look forward with desire to the
psychical sciences. Realistically viewed, past experience seems to show
that man's best effort will probably continue for some time to be the
use of human opinion, honestly developed, with all its frailty. To impose
legalistic inhibition without predictive standards is likely to produce mostly
confusion. Of the predictive sciences one thinks of psychiatry. There are
a dozen or so schools of thought or schools of psychiatric theory having
mutually exclusive predictive standards. There are various kinds of
psychiatrists. Some have predominantly psychoanalytic outlook. Some
follow one or another psychologic theory of mental illness and personality
deterioration. Some seem to believe that psychopathologic problems
are the result of faulty learning processes. Some seem to believe human
behavior is beyond control of the individual. Most seem to be treatment
oriented but fewer seem to be outcome oriented. An overview allows
the opinion that even standards of psychiatrists are closely akin to sub-
jectivity disguised in the robe of solemn objectivity underguarded with
psychiatric terminology. If the law cannot look to psychiatry for stan-
dards of behavior, then care should be exercised before looking away from
the quoted parole percentages. Are psychiatrists' percentages better? A
psychiatrist who is useful in parole decision making and in predicting
the behavioral outcome of a parolee will probably not apply psychiatric
standards which are generally middle class. He will probably apply the
same experiential standards traditionally applied by parole board members.
He will not be bound by legal form when he questions patients to form
his prognosis.
Whether man will come to define standards may be argued at length.
Today, people whose only single conviction is for use of LSD have flash-
backs and commit violent homicide. Standards for predicting such be-
havior are not now known and probably will be developed, if at all, under
8
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a system enabling observation with freer release and return. Sentences are
now much shorter in New York. Some say arrest quotas in New York
City produce unfair drug law enforcement. To those who have no lawyer,
parole boards have always been "courts of last resort." Prisoners' minds
should be more attentive to the somewhat limited rehabilitative programs
and less distracted by anxiety about appeals and judicial decisions con-
cerning technical legal rules if society is to be protected.
Parole is not alone in being changed-almost all things and relation-
ships are being altered. Precision is yet a valid governmental goal in
programming, but moreover there must be an accepting sensitivity to
change with a feel for allowable momentum. It seems today that to-
morrow is now. Judicial mandates must be performed, and in so doing
parole functionaries must utilize all available skills to interpret judicial
directions in relation to parole's overall purpose and to direct its applica-
tion of judicial directions toward maintaining positive societal influences.
Many people are able to use logic and reason and objectively interpret
and interrelate judicial precedent. Few are able to relate to the intrinsic
nature of parole. The entire correctional function is of low governmental
priority. The prevailing tendency is to brush corrections under the rug
and to pretend their challenging problems don't exist.
Appropriation of resources for corrections has never approached what
has been needed. In New York, fiscal appropriations have been generous
to parole and for narcotics control. Whether there is public commitment
to be sustained, liberal financing of corrections is yet to be learned.
Broadly speaking, ordinariness is built into correctional systems by the
overburden of people with problems the correctional program cannot solve.
Penuriousness builds in ordinariness. Narcotics addicts and alcoholics
have medical or social maladies which are largely unaffected by prison
sentences. These and others similarly afflicted are a growing group. Less,
not more, money for governmental purposes seems reasonably expectable.
Sometimes the most descriptive way to picture a low priority is to
describe the opposite. Let's look at involvements of a high priority gov-
ernmental activity also having as its purpose protection of communities
and development of people. Let's glance at defense. The Center Magazine,
a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, P. 0.
Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California 93103, in its January, 1970, issue
said the Department of Defense
• . . furnishes one out of every nine jobs in the United States. The
eighty billion dollar Defense budget accounts for half the total annual
9
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expenditures of the national government. If one adds to this the cost
of past wars (in veterans' pensions, military hospitals, etc.), the military
receive seventy cents from every dollar of taxes levied on the American
people . . . a summary of General Accounting Office studies covering
the period from May, 1963, to May, 1964 (revealed), ascertainable
waste of five hundred million dollars in a five percent sample of pro-
curements ... the world spent approximately one hundred and seventy-
three billion dollars for military purposes in 1968 ....
Corrections exist at the level of low priority. Menechino promises an
increase in parole costs.
What follows is not offered as a model of technically absolute legal
writ. It is an expression of impressions and inclinations. It is intended
to discourage continuation of a trend toward imposing legalistics upon
parole or at least to retard timing within the trend.
Due process is not always synonymous with judicial process.
Due process of law is a constitutional guaranty of fundamental fair-
ness and justice in proceedings against life, liberty or property. The pro-
cedural aspect of due process mandates notice and an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the involvements in issues being decided. Rules
governing such proceedings must be established and must be of general
application. The rules need not disregard preservation of group interests
involved in issues being decided. Hearings must be before a competent,
impartial and fair functionary empowered to hear and determine the issues
presented.
Due process is not only satisfied by traditional past practices, but may
be 'satisfied by new, fair procedures. Administrative agencies regulate mat-
ters from licenses to jail. Due process does not require all administrative
processes to be alike. Fairness seems to be the essence of the guaranty of
procedural due process. Fairness may be variously formed. Nothing in law
-requires parole officials unfairly to disregard their duty to protect public
safety by adopting procedures which diminish the effectiveness of their
direct and intimate probe into individuals according to case history
mandates before their release into communities and, if necessary, before
return to imprisonment.
The New York Court of Appeals has created a new type parole hearing
characterized by limited participation by counsel. Counsel is similarly
limited by rules of other administrative agencies and also at some stages
in legal trials, such as at a sentencing procedure. This decision is a bode-
ment of ill only if administrators fail to apply it in a manner improving
10
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decision making. In my judgment, there is minimal affectation to be
expected from counsel's presence at hearings in assistance of parolees.
Harm may result if counsel functions beyond the limits which grow out of
the inherent nature of parole hearings. Education is not only what is
learned but also who it is learned with. So also is parole not alone fair
decisions, but also the interplay of attitudes like mutual confidence be-
tween decision makers and those whose liberty is decided. This confidence
has markedly and positively contributed to order in prisons. If lawyers do
more than accurately inform of facts as parolees see them, then lawyers
will not enhance these attitudes; they will then interfere by intercession.
If the presence of lawyers facilitates parolees considering parole boards
their antagonists, then the presence of lawyers to that extent, will have
harmed correctional processes.
New York's parole board must apply the Menechino decision. Other
boards will have to apply comparable decisions. Ever constant are judicial
determinations purposed upon correlating individual and group interests.
The judicial decisions will vary according to values, areas, attitudes,
experiences and circumstances. Interpretations will differ according to
attitudes, experiences and composition of boards. Many fair parole
procedures conceivably flow from Menechino. The search is for a
procedure which does not violate either Menechino or parole relationships.
The court's intention seems to be embodied in its following language
... participation by counsel need be no greater than is required to assure,
to the board as well as to the parolee, that the board is, insofar as the
parolee is concerned, accurately informed of the facts before it acts, and
the permitted presentation of testimony by the parolee need be no greater
than is necessary for that same purpose." The clause ". . . insofar as
parolee is concerned . . ." is the court's limitation upon counsel's function.
He is to assist in presenting the thrust of parolee's position. He may
analyze, question and persuade against reported charges. He is to assist
the government of checks and balances-this may prove to be a balance of
value. The court clearly repeats the Correction law and adds: "It is
apparent, therefore, that the board is vested with unfettered discretion in
deciding whether or not a parole violation has occurred and, if it has,
whether or not parolees should be returned to prison ... "
Counsel should not be permitted discovery of material which is pre-
sented for the board's consideration in support of specific charges. Cer-
tainly, information submitted by professional parole staff because of its
confidential relationships should not be disclosed. To disclose would
11
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mitigate against community interests. Confidentiality should not be lim-
ited to sensitive material, for parole staffs should be permitted to exercise
their professions without the deterrent of cross-examination by counsel
in parole hearings. Such would unproductively consume their time; as is
attested to, by police testimony in courts. Such would place them un-
necessarily in a position openly adverse to parolees. To extend this
decision beyond its letter would seem to tend to sacrifice the public equity
in preservation of the board's exercise of discretion and staff's professional,
custodial effectiveness. A parole officer must not only be a peace officer,
but also benefactor, in order to make citizens' homes more secure. His
privilege to practice his profession is equal to lawyers' professional
privileges.
Crime is caused by many factors. The causal relationships are com-
plex. There are at least two groups of causes: those having to do with
individual attitudes, qualities and values, and those related to externals
operating upon individuals. Correctional offerings may produce in-
dividual change, but societal influences are far less responsive to reformative
effort. Transformation of an individual from an offender into abidance
occurs if the correctional experience develops strength with which to cope
with himself in the environment to be experienced.
The most effective correctional system will be one which requires the
shortest incarceration and earliest reintroduction into communities. The
probability is that the system enabling more facile passage between prison
and community will minimize injury from faulty release and (or) return
judgment, and thus will provide greatest societal protection.
The following procedures would seem to accord due process under
Menechino and protect against inept presentations by parolees of facts in
their interest. Administrative rule changes would be needed to establish
the procedures.
I
Notify technical parole violators, and no others, of their right to
acquire counsel to render them assistance. Technical violators are violators
other than those absconding and those convicted of crime while on parole.
Where there has been an intervening judicial conviction or where parolee
has absconded, counsel should not be allowed.
II
Provide counsel with clear and definitive statements of how parole is
alleged to have been violated. Provide counsel with no information about
12
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supporting material in parole reports. Staff recommendations and sup-
porting materials are often not only fact, but fact intermingled with
behavioral evaluation and prediction. They are professional products.
Thus combined, such may necessarily be inexact and subject to interpreta-
tion. For these and other reasons, many varied backgrounds are included
among members of parole boards. These boards, as groups, are probably
more aware of the numerous possible interpretations than lone counsel
can supply from parolee's position. This inexactitude is clearly recognized
by parole boards as they ponder men's fates, and it long has been recog-
nized without counsel's intervention.
In those states where the parole board is an independent body not
responsible for overseeing supervisory staff, it is in a position permitting
less reason to question its impartiality. It is not unreasonable to continue
assignment to it the responsibility of protecting confidences, screening
hearsay and fairly treating individual liberty. The Menechino decision
does not reassign these duties.
Some observers of parole thrust the challenge that parole boards do
not uniformly apply clearly defined standards of parole selection. Other
observers answer that the standards applied by jurors after being judicially
charged are no less obscure than the standards of parole board members
functioning within the polarities of the rule permitting releases which are
compatible with societal welfare and only upon reasonable probability that
if released, the person will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law.
The evaluative decisions of a parole board reflect the experience and
values of its member deciders. The following might be meaningfully in-
dicative of the considerations of a parole board member in deciding whether
it is probable that a given person will live normally if released, or whether
after release a person's condition or conduct requires restraint of liberty.
1. To understand the parole candidate's intentions. In this area the
decider might be strongly influenced by reported opinions of others,
particularly of parole staff, about the candidate's apparent attitudes and
manifested motivations; and
2. To visualize the environmental and attitudinal influences likely
to have confronted 'him before and during the alleged violative behavior;
and
3. To balance against (1) and (2) the candidate's strengths and
weaknesses likely to bear upon his control of his own behavior. In this
area the decider probably will rely more upon his own judgment; i.e.,
13
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his personal experience and values, than upon others' reports. In draw-
ing this balance, how the parole candidate genuinely feels about things
will be quite a valuable indicator.
4. To project what parole supervision or institution offers in terms
of the candidate's needs as the decider views both the needs and the
offerings. The decider will probably, at this point, formulate his idea
of how he considers the candidate might respond to offered super-
visional suggestion and control.
The foregoing tends toward development of an attitudinal inclination
in the decider's thinking. With this inclination decider might weigh
past acts and environmental promises and arrive at his decision to release
or to re-imprison. This individual decision adjusted by other individual
decisions of the board (or panel of board members) has been permitted
as an imperfect finality with productive results.
At a parole revocation hearing the parolee may be returned to parole
supervision in the community rather than continued in prison. The revoca-
tion hearing panel must decide factually whether there was a violation.
It must also decide what are parolee's attitude and motivation. May he
continue toward social readjustment at home? Is he so prompted toward
misconduct as to require imprisonment? What is the matter? Will his
maladjustment most effectively be corrected; will his needs best be met
in the prison or in the community? Underlying all else are the same
basic questions as are basic in a release hearing; namely, will he live
and remain at liberty without violating the law; is release compatible with
the welfare of society?
Many kinds of questions become involved in parole revocation hearings.
The scope of inquiry is broad and diverse when considered generally. Yet
in particular cases often there appears a simple and precise need to cause
an alleged violator to discuss an intimate matter for evaluative considera-
tion. The examination to determine whether there has been a violation
is closely interrelated with the examination to evaluate predictive in-
dicators. It will be difficult to separate the two examinations. Under
Menechino, the factual examination promises to be legalistically rigid.
Menechino does not expressly alter the attitudinal examination.
Elements which control deciders' judgments in one decision may not
be significant factors in another decision involving a person whose history
presents a dissimilar risk. Deciders will use personal experiences and
values to establish what weight to give case factors and how to assess
relationships. Many such experiential standards are almost reflexive from
14
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case stimuli. Of these, deciders may have no cognitive state of conscious-
ness to permit later measurement. This seems to be the same posture of a
juror. Exact identification of these personal standards promises to be a
tedious endeavor. Some may doubt the value of such. Such identification
might be an avoidable attraction to others having a different experiential
persuasion to attempt mechanically to apply the identified standards to
the detriment of an otherwise more reliable decision by a group of deciders.
III
Counsel should not be permitted to subpoena parole staff. Field and
supervisory staff should continue to be completely excluded from violation
hearings. Charges of violations grow out of the application of professional
training and experience. These charges should be treated as prima facie
proof of their content casting upon counsel the burden of going forward,
but not entitling him to the right to discover, nor to confront, nor to cross-
examine staff or its sources. If parole budgets and proven past per-
formances of professional parole staffs are worthy, let them be worth a
presumption of validity. These staff people enable creation of parolees from
prisoners by their influence and reports. Upon what basis should it be
functionally assumed without proof that they would deny the status to
which they elevated a person without valid reason? Please again refer
to the oft quoted percentages.
Argument likely to abound from questions about sufficiency of legal
specificity will tend to disengage evaluative mental processes of parole
board deciders. Their duty is to predict behavior and not to debate
language extents and preferences. Counsel's duty should be limited to
helping the parolee say whatever he wants to say. If parole is to be
attacked as a system, let such follow a showing of failure or unfairness.
Destructive disengagement by interdisciplinary permeation should be pre-
vented.
Correction law, section 218, now 212, subdivision 7, does not say
parolees are entitled to "defend against" charged violations; it does not
express this entitlement in language ordinarly applied to trial. It provides
that at a revocation hearing parolees shall have opportunity to ".. . explain
the alleged violation. . . ." Is not the use of the word "explain" a tacit
legislative assumption of validity of the charge? That word must be
strained to convert it into a license to launch a full probe into staff stan-
dards at each parole revocation proceeding. To introduce this repetitive
addendum into parolee proceeding by administrative interpretation would
15
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be of questionable fiscal advisability. Such introduction would be legally
questionable. A balance should be maintained between the benefit of the
unobstructed exercise of professional social casework with the probable
expectation of value from legalistic imposition.
IV
At revocation hearings counsel shall enjoy the broadest reasonable
latitude in presenting parolee's explanation. The last four words in
Menechino say that the parolee shall be ". . . permitted to call wit-
nesses . . ." at the revocation hearing. These words of grant stand
singularly alone. No direct reference is made to them elsewhere in the
opinion. There must be administrative interpretation of their meaning.
The decision does not specify the manner in which witnesses may be called
upon, but leaves that to administrative detrmination. A witness is one
whose testimony is desired, including all persons from whom testimony
is to be extracted; i.e., deponents, affiants and people delivering oral
testimony. To call is to bring forth or produce after procurement.
It would seem that the court's mandate will have been satisfied if the
parolee is permitted to introduce into the revocation hearing whatever
testimony he and his counsel wish in written form. The decision does not
expressly say the board must hear oral testimony. Oral testimony sug-
gests recording and reproducing what has been said, subpoena power over
parole staff, subpoena of other prisoners, even mentally ill prisoners, expert
witnesses and the like. More legal knowledge will be required of board
members if oral testimony is involved. Evidentiary rulings and extent of
cross-examination will become problematical. Who will pay witnesses'
travel expenses? Delays, travel, schedules, motions and appeals accompany
oral testimony.
Parole boards have little need for witnesses to be present. They need
not rely upon cross-examination of a witness to render a decision. A board
would probably prefer to have parole staff investigate and interview people
about points raised by counsel and also about matters ancillary to such
newly presented points upon the basis of which the witness may have
formed his opinion. A board of parole does not perform its duty by
deciding only upon facts presented to it at a hearing. Its duty is not only
to function as a jury. It has an overriding duty to find the truth. It must
send staff to search and verify. Whatever interest it has in confrontation
of witnesses at a hearing may be waived by it in favor of its professional
16
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staff's verification and evaluation. Nothing in Menechino prohibits this
waiver. Since oral testimony is not expressly required, it should not be
permitted administratively by extending the Menechino rule.
Oral testimony should be excluded. Witnesses should not appear at
parole hearings. Counsel should be permitted to produce relevant testi-
mony and introduce it in written form. Such is how all facts and opinions
have always been submitted by all others than parolees in all New York
parole hearings. This is more convenient for witnesses.
Law provides for depositions and commissions to take testimony. Such
procedure enables presentation of testimony in written form and entitles
the testimony to the same force and effect as if orally presented in a trial.
It seems an analogous exercise if an administrative agency decides written
form to be the usual form and the form most suitable to the performance of
its function.
The percentages show that about two-thirds of eligibles are released.
The percentages do not show inordinate returns. Parole has always been
fairly administered. Since unfairness has not been shown, there is no
indication that these four words (... permitted to call witnesses... ) were
intended to convert what has been a productive, administrative interview
or hearing into a trial.
V
Following counsel's presentation and as a part of the revocation hear-
ing the board may interview parolee exactly as has been done from parole's
beginning until now. While counsel is entitled to be present during this
interview portion of the revocation hearing, counsel should neither par-
ticipate nor intervene in this interview in even the slightest manner.
He should not by gesture, voice, movement, inflection or otherwise distract
nor impede its conduct or participation in same and for so doing counsel
should be removable from the hearing. This interview should occur when-
ever the board or hearing panel deems such necessary to perform its con-
tinuing, unfettered duty to decide. It is not a mandatory part of every
revocation hearing because the board may consider itself sufficiently in-
formed by counsel's presentation without an interview. This interview may
vary in length and coverage as now. The board may require further in-
formation to be supplied by staff with or without an interview. In any
event, it is not necessary that there be direct contact between staff, its
sources of information and counsel at the hearing.
17
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VI
In the absence of counsel, the board shall ascertain findings of facts
and cause to be issued to counsel a written statement of the findings.
VII
In the absence of counsel, the board shall enter a determination whether,
and if so, how much additional time shall be served by the returned parolee.
This should be tentative at the time of entry and should not then be com-
municated to either counsel or parolee.
VIII
Counsel shall be granted a fixed period of time to file a written brief
refuting matters raised in the interview and attacking the findings of fact.
Fairness requires that counsel be enabled to argue against coverage of
the interview. Counsel was excluded from participation in such. He must
be able to attack its content.
If no brief is filed within the time fixed, the time to be served, estab-
lished according to paragraph VII, shall no longer be tentative, but shall
become binding on the date fixed for submission of briefs.
If such brief is filed by counsel, the board (or hearing panel) shall con-
sider the brief, reconsider its findings of fact and notify counsel in writing
of the facts thereafter finally ascertained, which will be binding when
so established. Parolee shall be informed of the additional time he shall
serve as soon as practicable after the decree becomes binding.
Release and return decisions should not now be treated as just other
casework decisions. Imprisonment and release to freedom are viewed by
society in a way as to be best served by these decisions being rendered by
functionaries apart from supervisory continuum. Human liberty is an
elevated status in public opinion. Once corrections and parole enjoy greater
public acceptance, perhaps decisions to release and return may be treated
ordinarily. They are extraordinary now, in the public eye, and their
demotion would be a premature invitation to an avoidable attack on a
developing facet of the correctional process.
The foregoing procedures seem to me best to meet the demands made
upon a parole board with large volumes of serious decisions to be rendered
in an assertive jurisdiction. Many procedures different from those enu-
merated also could satisfy the inclinations of other parole board mem-
bers, while also satisfying the stated rule in the Menechino decision.
A commanding wariness accompanies me in two of its major areas.
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I hope the proportion of our current parole releases to today's volume of
crime continues to be acceptable as community assets. The unstated rule
in the Menechino decision is unsettling. That unstated rule is that ex-
cellent parole agency performance is inadequate to meet the requirements
of legal frames of reference. It is clearly insufficient to function with
excellence. Additionally, it is required to anticipate degrees of changes in
law and to function acceptably therewithin.
Parole authorities must re-examine their rules, regulations, prohibitions
and allowances. Such must be re-evaluated in terms of today's pandemic
-the social revolution. Both substance and procedure invite consideration
for adjustment. It may be unacceptable, as vague, to require a parolee to
perform his promise to obey the reasonable direction of a parole officer.
Rules prohibiting parolees from attending questionable resorts, or from
associating with evil companions may be reasonably understood and
supportable in reason, but these rules may not be acceptable as obscure
and unenforceable. It may be unacceptable as unreasonable to restrain
parolees from obtaining automobile operator's licenses. Modes of quick
travel are commonly available-maybe it will be unacceptable to require
parolees to obtain permission before leaving the community into which
parole was granted. There is good reason to protect against some parolees
changing residence or employment without prior approval of a parole
officer. Others possess sufficient stability for the community to be pro-
tected if they have freedom to change residence and employment and later
inform parole officers. It may become unacceptable to require prior notices
by all parolees. Acceptability may depend upon the paroling authority
deciding which people must give prior notice. If parole officers make the
decision, acceptability may depend upon confidence between them and
parolees. It may be unacceptable to deny parolees' rights to work where
alcohol is sold: liquor regulator's rules may fall. How much protection
flows to communities from denial of voting privileges to parolees?
There is no parole rule against the enforcement of which protest can-
not be imagined. Parole administrators can take no comfort from severe
changes without proof of shortcomings. Then there is the fact that a
single questionable parole release can jeopardize an entire parole system.
Today is characterized by permissiveness. But parole administrators who
release liberally while markedly relaxing regulations may be trying to
mix oil and water. The judicial pendulum constantly swings defining
preponderances between group and individual protections. Under Men-
echino, supra, administrators of sensitive parole programs tend to be
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deprived of necessary exactness in the fundamental law which defines their
public duties. The Menechino, supra, decision promises the uncertainty
of subjugation to judicial appeals where formerly there were clear, certain
and positive duties to decide finally. The uncertainties which accompany
the unstated rule in the Menechino, supra, decision are legion. There is
reason to sincerely hope that parole uncertainties will be increased only to
satisfy a clear and compelling need.
Some changes may be best if by administrative initiation, others if by
legislation, and still others if judicially decreed. The best changes will
probably follow knowledgeable interchanges of ideas. The legal profession
does not involve itself sufficiently in corrections for its ideas to be im-
pressed on operations of the parole system except by judicial decree.
A creative service can be rendered to corrections by lawyers through pro-
fessional associations and otherwise without case by case intervention.
I rememebr a jury trial of a man who signed a confession which sup-
ported the first degree robbery charge for which he was being tried. His
defense was that he had been the recipient of a gift. The story he told
in court sounded as believable as did the content of his written statement.
I doubt whether anyone but him and the alleged donor knows whether
he told the truth orally or in writing. Guilt or innocence was decided upon
what was presented. There was a compromise verdict, guilty of petit
larceny. The district attorney relied upon the confession. Defense counsel
was young, broke and court assigned before the days of separate pro-
ceedings to test voluntariness of confessons. Defense counsel seemed
surprised when the confession first appeared. Maybe accused did not tell
him about it.
I enjoyed the give and take of criminal trials. I will personally enjoy
the give and take of lawyers in parole hearings. I quit criminal practice
because my clients were broke. I do not think lawyers will bring better
decisions to parole . I do not think more people will become parolees. I
do not think introduction of lawyers into parole is progressive. I hope
the mingling of lawyers and parole officers will make parole more
acceptable. I am reluctantly willing to order a long, black robe, if I must.
Since 1959 it has been my privilege to be a member of New York's
Board of Parole which, during my tenure has been composed of men of
various strains including Polish, Dutch, German, Puerto Rican, Negro
and probably others; Jewish, Catholic and Protestant are religious faiths of
its members. Presently, three lawyers are one-fourth of its membership,
two other of its lawyers were recently promoted. Primary life experiences
20
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol3/iss1/3
COUNSEL IN PAROLE HEARINGS
of its members also include teaching, law enforcement and sea captaincy:
four members, including the Chairman, are from parole staff ranks.
Quite often I look at a man before us and think, "There, but for the
grace of God go I." Others with whom I work say they do also. Quite
often I look into Criminal Courts and I read about Civil Court calendar
jams and delayed justice. Before I commenced writing these offerings, I
asked myself if I were in the chair of judgment in parole, would I prefer
my liberty being dependent upon a decision like those resulting from plea
bargaining in courts today, or from our board. I decided I would rather
take a chance with plea bargaining justice, for most likely I would want
freedom regardless of other considerations. I then asked -, which is
best for my community? I decided it is probably best to let the poor man's
criminal court of last resort be a highly carefully selected board having
members with varying points of view, experiences and backgrounds acting
fairly with finality, with appellate courts functioning to prevent abuse.
Much is yet unknown about how to redirect men's lives. Much re-
mains to be done to achieve uniformity of criminal sentences. Legal prac-
tices sorely need modernizing. Now seems not the time to further over-
burden a developing parole system with the limitations of another over-
burdened entity. Now seems not the time to return to an overburdened
judiciary what was put under administrative aegis because of need for
expertise and unmanageable volume. There is greater complexity and
larger volume today.
Lawyers promise to bring a more rigid form to parole hearings with
minimal addition to substance because fairness already characterizes
parole. Has parole's performance been less efficient than courts? Are
parole decisions more irregular or less uniform than are courts' sentences?
Neither seems answerable: "yes." The introduction of legalistics risks
-retrogression.
There are some who say they believe that because judges are elected
and juries represent popular prejudices, minority groups cannot get fair
criminal trials. These would be likely to feel that return of parole to
courts would be discriminatory. Is now the time to restrain a board with
a record of the foregoing percentages? Hopefully not! Some states have
parole boards which were selected with sensitivity, not only of functional
capacities, but also of the need for group representation. Restraint of those
boards by the return of the paroling power to courts can be interpreted
as retrogression.
Release hearings must be meaningful in terms of the candidate's weak-
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nesses and evaluative of changes in their personal equations. Changes in
attitudes are therein tested. Responses to interview pressures may be
related to environmental pressures. A skillful interviewer gains valuable
impressions of the candidate's likely response to social and emotional de-
mands after release. Faced with histories of impulsivity, poor judgment,
inadequacy or temper, tolerances may be estimated. A board member's
interview often is an avenue of testing controls according to reported
capacities and an opportunity to evaluate expressions of social awareness.
I can think of only slight assistances counsel might render to board's exer-
cise of the above evaluative duties. On the contrary, their presence will
likely tend to transmit pressures of the interview from candidates to board
members who may not be legally trained. Counsel may even be a means
of disguising real assertions by candidates. Counsel insulates the real
candidate from the board. Counsel then leaves the candidate after the
hearing to his own devices and to the resources of the system he imagines
protected him against during a hearing.
Parole's effectiveness is directly proportional to its capacity to be
viewed by prison populations, as merciful, as just. I submit that it is so
viewed and offer as proof the comparatively few requests for counsel
in the face of their allowance into the federal systems in Michigan, Mary-
land and in New York up to the time of this writing.
Ongoing is the dilemma. Some say parole is granted too liberally.
They can be answered by reference to the recent creation of conditional
and mandatory releases. Others charge that parole boards are too re-
strictive. Those may be answered by reference to crime frequency data,
the within statistical record of New York's board and to Menechino.
Some regard parole boards as expressors of community tolerances and
restrictions within correctional systems. One parole board error in judg-
ment can jeopardize an entire parole function. Parole board members must
keep attuned to community allowances. This is made more difficult when
parole's legal foundation shifts to create benefits which seem obscure.
I urge that this and similar decisions not be extended by admin-
istrative interpretation. It is my hope that time of extensions be quite
cautious and remain absolutely judicial. The best in parole, the best in
correction, is yet to be. There is much to be explored, much to be learned,
much to be developed. Do not lengthen the stay of some in prison houses
of our system by further inhibiting the development of free release and
return in parole processes.
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In addition the Parole Board held hearings and made decisions for inmates of local
correctional institutions to the extent of 1,177 in 1967; 5,335 in 1968; 5,463 in
1969 and 5,458 in 1970.
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